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NATURAL RESOURCES

Aulston v. United States, 915 F.2d 584
Author: Judge Seymour
Beneath plaintiff Joe and Lola Aulston's land existed deposits of
carbon dioxide gas. The land was originally granted under Federal land
patents pursuant to the Agriculture Entry Act of 1914, 30 U.S.C.
§§ 121-125 (the "Act"). The patents reserved to the United States
rights to "gas" associated with the land. The Aulstons alleged that
"gas" referred to combustible hydrocarbon gas only and not to carbon
dioxide. The Department of Interior found that the term "gas" included carbon dioxide. The Interior Board of Land Appeals ("IBLA")
upheld the Department's determination. The district court affirmed the
IBLA, and the Aulstons appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment after making an in-depth review of the policy, history, and legislative intent behind the Act. It determined that Congress is silent on this precise
question, but that the Interior Department, in its promulgated regulations concerning the word "gas," gave broad interpretations which included carbon dioxide. The court found such interpretations consistent
with the policy of the Act and not in violation of legislative intent.
Bennion v. Shell Western E & P, Inc., 905 F.2d 324
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, Bennion, brought suit against defendant, Shell Western E
& P, Incorporated ("Shell"), for his share of the production proceeds
from oil and gas wells in which he had an interest. Bennion also sought
punitive damages for Shell's alleged willful and malicious failure to pay
his proportionate share of production. The district court held that
Bennion was not entitled to punitive damages as a matter of law. Bennion subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of punitive
damages. The court explained that the action brought by Bennion
sounded in contract. It is well settled in Utah that breach of a contract
will not support punitive damages.
Howell Petroleum Corp. v. Samson Resources Co., 903 F.2d 778
Author: Judge Anderson
Plaintiff, Howell Petroleum Corporation ("Howell"), brought suit
to collect royalties owed on oil and gas wells by defendant, Samson Resources Company ("Samson"). Although a three year statute of limitations period for recovery of royalties applied, Howell argued for the
adoption of a different limitations period. It reasoned that the action
was one for the imposition of a constructive trust. The district court
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held, however, that Howell was not entitled to a constructive trust because that theory had not been pleaded. Accordingly, the court awarded
Howell only those royalties which came due in the three years preceding
the suit.
The Tenth Circuit reversed, construing a constructive trust as a remedial device employed by courts to enforce substantive rights. Moreover, the statute of limitations applicable to the underlying cause of
action governs a constructive trust. Consequently, the court limited
Howell's recovery to those royalties which came due in the three years
preceding the suit. Further, the court awarded Howell statutory interest
on the late royalty corresponding to the portion of its title which was
marketable.
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. FederalEnergy Regulatory Comm'n, 904 F.2d
1469
Author: Judge Brorby
Defendant, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"), ordered prospective elimination of the minimum bill provision in a gas
supply contract between plaintiff, Natural Gas Pipeline Company of
America ("NGPC") and Colorado Interstate Gas Company ("CIG").
FERC eliminated this provision because it was unnecessary under the
rate redesign and because of its new policy toward minimum billing. After being denied rehearing on the order, NGPC appealed FERC's prospective, rather than retroactive, elimination of the minimum bill
provision.
The Tenth Circuit held that FERC could only grant retroactive relief if the minimum bill provision fit within the narrow "integrality" exception to § 4 of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717(c) and (d). To
fall within this exception, the minimum bill provision must be integrated
with the proposed rate change, instead of the existing rate design. Since
NGPC failed to do this, it was denied retroactive relief. Thus, the court
affirmed FERC's ruling granting only prospective relief under § 5 of the
Natural Gas Act.
Phillips 66 Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatoy Comm 'n, 903 F.2d
1310
Author: Judge Seth
Plaintiff, Phillips 66 Natural Gas Company ("Phillips"), attempted
to collect power and fuel allowances for costs related to the operation of
certain pipeline compressors. The Director of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") stated that Phillips had no contractual
power to collect the allowances as production related expenses. Phillips
subsequently appealed, alleging that the director violated an earlier
FERC mandate by stating that area rate clauses were insufficient authorization to collect the allowances.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the director's decision.
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The court first noted the importance of intent in determining what production related expenses are recoverable. Further, the court ruled that
the contracting parties mutually intended Phillips to collect allowances
pursuant to the area rate clauses in question. The director and the
FERC erroneously relied on the presumption of noncollectability of
compression allowances under area rate clauses. Finally, the court
stated that the director's approach was inconsistent with the general rule
that the contracting parties decide who should bear the production related costs.

